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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action concerns a small parcel of real property which was 
part of a larger tract derived from a U.S. Patent in 1871. 900 
South Street, in Provo, proceeded east from University Avenue and 
existed as a public highway since before 1869 and it continued as 
such until 1989. The highway was never dedicated as a public 
street and existed only as a public easement. The parcel of 
property constituting 900 South existed on the County Recorder's 
records as an unowned parcel situated between Plaintiffs1 
properties and Defendant's property. 
Plaintiffs and appellants own property bounded on the south 
side by this public easement. Defendants own property bounded on 
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the north side by this public easement. 
Defendants Provo City, et al, voted to vacate this street 
without notice or an opportunity to be heard. Upon vacating the 
street, Provo City seized the street, joined it with land 
previously owned to the South for the purpose of gleaning a 
commercial building lot. This action by Provo City deprived 
Plaintiffs of street front property which had existed in the Provo 
business district for over 100 years and landlocked a parcel of 
land owned by Plaintiff Stephen Whitlock. The trial court quieted 
title in Defendants. The issues presented for this Court's review 
involve the interests Plaintiffs have in the real property claimed 
by Provo City. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Utah statutory law and common law provide that the 
transfer of any real property bounded by a roadway passes title of 
the person whose title is passed to the center of the road. Upon 
the city vacating the roadway, the title reverts to the abutting 
landowners. Utah authority is clear and on point. 
2. Defendant Provo City makes an improper assumptions, the 
improper assumption is that Provo City held title to the roadway 
pursuant to the Patent from the United States. The patent did not 
vest title in Provo City, it vested title in a trustee. The entity 
Provo City was never intended to hold title pursuant to federal 
law. Even if Provo City retained fee simple title to this 
property, the conveyance by the U.S. government's trustee to 
Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest would have conveyed the 
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property to the centerline of the roadway pursuant to common law 
and statutory principles. 
3. Defendant's constitutional argument that "The Utah 
Township Act cannot be interpreted to burden the absolute power of 
Congress to dispose of public lands by patent," is raised for the 
first time on appeal and should not be considered. Even if 
considered, the Utah Supreme Court held as early as 1875 that the 
Utah Township act was in compliance with the Federal Townsite act. 
4. In the alternative, Plaintiffs pled and proved that 
Defendant failed to comply the statutory requirements prior to 
vacating the roadway. Provo City's Council met and passed an 
ordinance vacating the roadway. There was no notice, no fair 
hearing or consideration of any substantial rights involved. Even 
if Due Process requirements were met, and the public easement was 
vacated, Plaintiffs private easement would have persisted. 
Boskovich et al. v. Midvale City Corp. et ah, 243 P.2d 435 (Utah 
1952). By taking the land and selling it, Defendant has deprived 
Plaintiffs of property or a property right without just 
compensation and in violation of Due Process rights. 
5. The rule that a Municipality acquires a "limited fee," a 
"determinable fee," or public easement in streets in platted 
subdivisions is well established in Utah and is not a "narrow 
exception" to the general rule. 
LAW DETERMANATIVE TO ISSUES 
Plaintiffs cite the following law to this court as 
determanative of the issues involved in this action: 
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Public Highways. When Deemed Dedicated 
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned 
to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a 
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years. 
(C.L. 17, 2801.) 
Sec. 36-1-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933 
FEDERAL TOWNSITE ACT, ch. 177, 14 Stat 541 (1867). The act is 
attached hereto as appendix 1. 
UTAH TOWNSHIP ACT, U.C.A. 57-7-1, et seq. The act is attached 
hereto as appendix exhibit 2. 
SEARS v. OGDEN CITY, 572 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977). The case is 
attached hereto as appendix exhibit 3. 
BOSKOVICH V. MIDVALE CITY CORP.. 243 P.2d 435 (Utah 1952). 
The case is attached hereto as appendix exhitit 4. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST OWNED 
TITLE AND REVERSIONARY INTEREST TO THE CENTER OF THE ROAD. 
The propriety of Provo City obtaining fee simple title as a 
result of the government patent is dealt with elsewhere, and it 
would be improper. For the sake of argument, Plaintiffs adopt the 
position of Provo City that it retained fee simple title to the 
property constituting the roadway 900 South. Provo City obtained 
fee simple title to the subject property pursuant to the U.S. 
government's patent. The Plaintiffs1 and Defendant's parcels were 
conveyed from that patent pursuant to the Federal Townsite Act and 
the State Township Act. Those conveyance were pursuant to 
statutory and common law principles. 
It is an admitted fact/ stated in Defendants1 brief and 
uncontested in this action that the roadway 900 South existed prior 
to 1869 when the first conveyances took place under the patent from 
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the United State Government. 
Under common law, the conveyance of real property bounded by 
the roadway passes title of the person whose estate is transferred 
to the center of the roadway. Many states, including Utah, have 
adopted this principle as a statutory law. The Utah Legislature 
and Supreme Court have adopted both common law and statutory 
approaches incorporating this law. 
A transfer of land bounded by a highway on a right-
of-way for which the public has only an easement passes 
the title of the person whose estate is transferred to 
the middle of the highway. 
§27-12-101, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended 1991). 
"When the Board acquired the fee for the land abutting the 
street, there was an presumption that the conveyance included the 
fee to the highway center line subject to the public right of way 
(determinable fee). Sears v. Oqden City, 572 P.2d 1359 (Utah 
1977), quoting Fenton v. Ceder Lumber and Hardware Co., 17 Utah 2d 
99, 404 P.2d 966 (Utah 1965). "Section 27-1-7, UCA 1953, fn 4 
provided in part: 
"* * * a transfer of land bounded by a highway 
passes the title of the persons whose estate is 
transferred to the middle of the highway." In Hummel v. 
Young,fn5 this court pointed out that this statute was 
declaratory of the common law, and that a private 
conveyance of land bounded by or abutting on a highway, 
the fee to which belongs to the abutting owners, is 
presumed to convey the fee to the highway to the center 
line thereof. This presumption is rebutted only by clear 
evidence that the grantor did not intend to convey his 
interest in the highway (notes omitted) 
Fenton, supra at 968. 
" . . . Midvale's council enacted an ordinance 
vacating the shaded area, which has been used by 
vehicular travel. The school board owned property 
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abutting on both sides of the shaded area, and it took 
possession thereof as owner to the middle of the vacated 
street, fenced it off and made it part of the school 
yard,..." 
Boskovich v, Midvale City Corp, 243 P.2d 435 (Utah 1952) 
A number of other jurisdictions have adopted the rule that a 
conveyance is presumed to carry title to the center of the street. 
Many of these included cases where the street appeared to be 
excluded by the description in the deed. In Champlain v. 
Pendleton. 13 Conn 23 (Conn. 1838) the description in the deed 
described the south line of the land conveyed as the same as the 
north line of the highway. The highway was not mentioned or 
referred to in the deed. It was held that the fee passed to the 
center of the highway. In Gear v. Barnum, 37 Conn 229 (Conn. 
1870), the Court held that a deed conveying "a store building and 
the land on which it stands," passes title and fee to the middle of 
the highway abutting the store and real property. 
In 1887 the Florida Supreme Court decided the case of Florida 
Southern Rye. Co. v. Brown, 23 Fla 104, 1 South 512 (Fla. 1887). 
The deed described the conveyance by words and figures but did not 
specifically mention a street or highway. It was held that the 
grantee takes to the center line of the street upon which he abuts. 
In 1886 the Massachusetts Supreme Court decided the case of Hamlin 
v. Pairpoint Manfq. Co., 141 Mass 51, 6 E. 531 (Mass. 1886). The 
court held that where deeded land is bounded on a street, or its 
boundary runs to the street and thence by the street, the grantee 
takes to the middle of the street unless the deed indicates a clear 
intent to exclude the street. 
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Provo City has cited New York law for the proposition that 
Defendant retained the street. However, the Court's attention is 
drawn to the case of Sizer v. Devereaux, 16 Barb 160 (N.Y. 1853) 
wherein it was held that where a parcel of land is described by 
courses and distances and no road is named but on proof at trial it 
is established that one line must be on a road, the land to the 
center of the road is included in the conveyance. 
B, DEFENDANTS' THEORY THAT THE ROADWAY WAS EXPRESSLY 
EXCLUDED BY METES AND BOUNDS DESCRIPTION WAS RAISED 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL BUT SHOULD FAIL UNDER 
UTAH AND COMMON LAW. 
Respondent Provo City argues in its brief that the metes and 
bounds descriptions in the deeds issued to Dunn and First Ward 
Pasture Company (respectively Plaintiffs' and Defendants1 
predecessors in interest) expressly excluded 900 South Street. 
This argument is being raised for the first time on appeal and did 
not constitute any element of the underlying trial or the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, or Judgment issued by the Trial Court 
in this case. Issues not raised before the trial court, nor 
decided by the trial court, should not be raised or determined by 
the appellant court. 
"It is axiomatic that matters not presented to the trial 
court may not be raised for the first time on appeal" 
Franklin Fin v. New Empire Dev. Co. . 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 
(Utah 1983). 
Progressive Acquisition, Inc. v. Lytle, 806 P. 2d 239 (Utah App. 
1991) 
In addition, Plaintiffs believe the case to have been properly 
framed by Defendants in the trial proceedings. Defendants1 counsel 
stated 
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. . .we would state the issue more broadly, and that is 
that Provo City owns this property in fee simple or do we 
merely have a right-of-way. 
I think the law will indicate and show that, if in 
fact, we own the parcel in fee simple, then we have the 
right to sell that parcel. If we have only a right-of-
way then we concur and agree with Plaintiffs1 counsel 
that then Plaintiffs' would take to the center of the 
street, (transcript of trial p. 16 lines 11-20). 
The issue was never raised, argued, or briefed that Provo City 
had created an express reservation or express exclusion pursuant to 
a metes and bounds description. In fact, as previously provided to 
this Court, the common law has not been so interpreted. 
Should this Court consider this matter, it should still fail. 
Many cases appear to be directly on point to the case presently 
before the court. In 1855 Wisconsin held that a grantee of a lot 
situated in a village platted and recorded according to law, 
described by metes and bounds, takes to the center of the street on 
which the lot abuts subject to the public easement. Kimball v. 
Kenosha, 4 Wis 321 (Wis. 1855). In 1895 the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that a deed describing lots conveyed by reference to a plat, 
which showed them bounded by a street, carried the fee in the land 
to the middle of the street opposite the lots, even though the 
statutory dedication of the street had been vacated. The 
dimensions of the lots did not include the street. Paine v. 
Consumers' Forwarding and Storage Co., 71 Fed 626 (1895). Other 
cites have been previously briefed to this Court. 
The case of Fenton v. Ceder Lumber and Hardware Co., supra is 
illustrative. The Court provided: " . . . that a private conveyance 
of land bounded by or abutting on a highway, the fee to which 
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belongs to the abutting owners, is presumed to convey the fee to 
the highway to the center line thereof. This presumption is 
rebutted only by clear evidence that the grant did not intend to 
convey his interest in the highway" Id. at 968 (emphasis added). 
The conveyance to Plaintiffs in this case satisfies the common 
law requirements, as Plaintiffs derive their fee interest in the 
real property from one who had the right to dispose of the fee 
interest in the roadway. In addition, the fact that the roadway 
was never separately platted, nor conveyed or recorded for a period 
in excess of 12 0 years, is further evidence that the grantor 
intended to convey by common law principles. 
C. KNIGHT V, THOMAS DID NOT PROVIDE THAT FEE SIMPLE TITLE 
VESTS IN CITY UPON VACATION OR ABANDONMENT. 
Provo City cites Knight v. Thomas for the proposition that the 
city owns the roadway in fee. In that case, Jesse Knight sued to 
enjoin Provo City from granting a street to the Rio Grande Western 
Railroad. A statute specifically required any such conveyance to 
be authorized by the general electorate. The Complaint 
specifically alleged fee simple absolute title to the roadway in 
Provo City. Appeal was taken from a demurrer. The Utah Supreme 
Court provided: 
The theory . . . is that the words "real property of such 
city or incorporated town," contained in §313 do not 
include, nor refer to streets of such city or town. We 
think that is true so far as the question pertains to a 
mere street in the city . . . but it is, in effect 
alleged in the Complaint that the city is the owner in 
fee of the land described in the Complaint and occupied 
by the street, . . . for the purposes of the demurrer the 
truth of these facts is admitted. 
Knight v. Thomas, 101 P. 383, 384 (Utah 1909). 
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Contrary to the position of Defendants in the present case, 
Knight v. Thomas does not hold that a city may have fee simple 
title to a roadway. 
POINT II 
THE ENTITY PROVO CITY DID NOT OWN FEE SIMPLE ABSOLUTE TITLE 
Provo maintains throughout its brief that it owned fee simple 
title pursuant to the U.S. Patent. A copy of that patent was 
attached to Plaintiffs1 brief as exhibit 1. The court should note 
that the patent did not convey fee simple absolute title to Provo 
City. The patent conveyed the real property to Abraham 0. Smoot as 
trustee "for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof 
according to their respective interests by virtue of an act of 
congress . . . " 
The authority cited by Defendant in its brief is illustrative 
of the improper assumption made by Provo. Provo claims that the 
corporate authorities of the Town of Provo became the purchasers of 
the patent pursuant to the patent issued by the U. S. Government. 
They further claim that they maintained their fee simple absolute 
ownership by failing to convey the land constituting 900 South. 
This is exactly the type of conduct that was prohibited by the 
federal legislature in passing the Townsite Act, as evidenced by 
the following exchange which occurred on the senate floor between 
Senator Howard of Michigan and Senator Coness of California (as 
provided in Defendant and Respondent's brief at 10): 
MR. HOWARD. Does the Senator from California mean to be 
understood that this bill provides that the corporate 
authorities of the town may become the purchasers? Is 
that the scheme here? 
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MR. CONESS. No, Sir. 
MR. HOWARD. I so understood him 
MR. CONESS. They simply enter the land as agents in trust for 
the occupants, those in possession. 
MR. HOWARD. Do they get a title? 
MR. CONESS. A title for the occupants from the United States. 
MR. HOWARD. Then they become the owners in trust. 
MR. CONESS. In trust. That is it exactly. 
Congressional Globe. 39 Cong., 2nd Sess. 1109 (1867). (emphasis 
added) 
In effect, Provo City is attempting to do exactly that which 
was opposed and intended to be avoided pursuant to the legislative 
history provided. 
In fact, Provo1s claim that it retains fee simple ownership 
in the roadway is directly opposed to the obligation imposed under 
the trust. Under the government patent, the public had only an 
easement and was entitled to no more. 
"These cases hold that the trustee under the 
Townsite Act holds the legal title to the lands for the 
use and benefit of the occupants according to their 
respective interests. That the respective interests of 
the occupants was to use and occupy the lands in the 
manner they had previously done. That the lands which 
had previously been used for streets and alleys and for 
other public purposes must be held by the trustee for the 
use of the occupants for the continuation of such use. . 
it 
. . 
Hall v. North Qgden City. 175 P. 2d 703, 709 (Utah 1946). The 
vacating of the roadway to obtain a commercial building lot, 
resulting in land-locking one lot and depriving two others of 
access to 900 South, would not be a continuation of the easement. 
The question arises what happens when the continuation of such 
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use is no longer appropriate, such as in this case where the street 
had been vacated. In Hall, the Supreme Court held that the 
underlying interest must revert to the owner of the underlying fee 
or the equitable owner. In this case, common law and equity 
existing at the time of the initial grant indicated that the 
underlying fee belonged in the abutter. 
POINT III 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UTAH TOWNSHIP ACT IS 
RAISED ON APPEAL FOR THE FIRST TIME, BUT IT FAILS ON ITS MERITS 
Respondent raises for the first time on appeal the idea that 
the Utah Township is unconstitutional pursuant to U.S. Constitution 
Article 4, Section 3. That issue is raised for the first time on 
appeal and was neither briefed, argued, nor decided below. It is 
well established that issues which are raised for the first time on 
appeal should not be considered by the appellate court. 
"It is axiomatic that matters not presented to the trial 
court may not be raised for the first time on appeal" 
Franklin Fin v. New Empire Dev. Co. , 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 
(Utah 1983). 
Progressive Acquisition, Inc. v. Lytle, 806 P. 2d 239 (Utah App. 
1991) 
Notwithstanding the original nature of this argument, this 
Court has previously held that the Township Act "was in harmony 
with the act of congress, and within the authority conferred by the 
act of congress upon the territorial legislature and the 
instruction given by the legislature to the act of congress in this 
particular is adopted by the court." Pratt v. Young, 1 Utah 3 47, 
354, (Utah 1876) The Federal Townsite Act is included as an 
addendum to this brief as Exhibit 1 and the State Township Act is 
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included as Exhibit 2. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT PROVO CITY IMPROPERLY VACATED 900 SOUTH 
AND THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY VIOLATED PROPERTY AND 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
Provo City has failed to even address the improper actions of 
vacating and selling the easement. The facts are undisputed that 
the mechanism whereby Provo City vacated the roadway 900 South 
consisted of "the regular Provo Municipal Council meeting of August 
22, 1989, the council passed ordinance number 0-89-055. This is an 
ordinance vacating and setting aside a part of 900 South Street 
near the intersection of 900 South and 100 East." The notice of 
vacation was published one time in the Provo Daily Herald on August 
31, 1989. (Trial exhibit no. 7, exhibit 7 to Plaintiffs1 brief, 
appendix A to Respondents1 brief). 
Plaintiffs had complained in paragraph 19 of the First Amended 
Complaint that "900 South University Avenue was never properly 
vacated pursuant to the ordinances of the city of Provo, and the 
laws of the state of Utah." (R. 12, 1119). In addition, Plaintiffs 
complained in paragraph 17 "the Defendants1 intent to seize and 
convey the land . . .is a seizure or taking of their property 
without due process of law . . . " (R.13, f17). These issues were 
briefed by Plaintiffs in their trial memorandum of February, 1992 
(R.44, Point VIII). 
The memorandum decision by the trial court failed to address 
these issues and on March 25, 1992, Plaintiffs filed a motion to 
alter or amend findings and request for findings on alternate 
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causes of action. Plaintiffs specifically sought a ruling on these 
issues (R.85) Although a subsequent hearing was held, the Court 
failed and refused to address those issues. 
A. 
PROVO CITY FAILED TO PROPERLY VACATE THE STREET 900 SOUTH 
In addition, or in the alternative, the vacating of a public 
street requires certain formalities. Utah Supreme Court confirmed 
the necessity of adherence by county to the procedural requirements 
for vacation of a county road to occur. Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 
P.2d 595 (Utah 1974). The doctrine should extend with equal 
persuasive effect to the vacation of a city roadway by a 
municipality pursuant to §10-8-8.4. The proof of publication 
provided by the City recorder of the City of Provo shows that an 
ordinance vacating the roadway was published one time on August 31, 
1989. The statute requires a notice of the pendency of a petition 
or intent of the governing body to be published once a week for 
four consecutive weeks. Since the City has failed to comply with 
statutory requirements, the vacating is ineffective. 
Plaintiffs believe the case of Boskovich et al v. Midvale City 
Corp et al 243 P. 2d 435 (Utah 1952) to be exactly identical and on 
point. In that case, the Midvale City Counsel, without notice to, 
application by, or hearing of any kind afforded any property owner, 
enacted an ordinance vacating a portion of Jordan Avenue and an 
alley which had been used by vehicular travel. The school board 
owned property abutting on both sides of the street and alley, and 
it took possession thereof as the owner to the middle of the 
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vacated street, fenced it off and made it part of the schoolyard, 
creating a cul-de-sac as to Plaintiffs1 property on Jordan Avenue 
and as to the property of Cox and Draper on the alley. Plaintiffs 
complained and the Supreme Court held: 
There are a number of ways that streets may be 
opened or closed. If by ordinance, there must be 
something more than its mere enactment. We believe and 
hold that the procedure followed by Midvale in this case, 
sans notice, petition or hearing, was an unquestioned 
departure from the elementary principle that property 
cannot be taken without due process of law and without 
just compensation. 
Furthermore, even if the city had satisfied the 
requirements of due process by giving requirements of due 
process by giving reasonable notice and conducting a fair 
hearing, still it could have vacated no more that the 
public easement or right which the city had in the shaded 
area, which would in turn have the effect of relieving it 
from further responsibility for maintenance and control. 
The private easement which Mr. B, plaintiff herein had, 
would have persisted. 
* * * 
Defendants are not remediless. Midvale might have 
ended the public easement by ordinance so long as 
pertinent statutory and due process requirements were 
satisfied. The school board might have eliminated the 
private easement by orderly employment of the statutory 
provisions and fundamental principles relating to eminent 
domain, but neither could take from Mr. B his private 
easement without fair compensation. 
Boskovich v. Midvale City Corp. 243 P.2d 435 (Utah 1952) 
Provo City failed to comply with the statutory scheme required 
to vacate a public roadway, and as such Plaintiffs are entitled to 
set aside the vacating ordinance, or are entitled to just 
compensation for their loss. 
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POINT B 
UPON VACATING THE STREET, PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED 
TO A PRIVATE EASEMENT OR COMPENSATION. 
Plaintiffs, and their predecessors in interest, have had 
passage over 900 South in Provo. That easement has been in 
existence for over 12 0 years. Section 10-8-8.5 provides that "any 
lot owner shall retain his right of way and easement in any street 
which has been vacated by the municipality." Therefore, these 
Plaintiffs maintain a right of passage over the roadway. 
It has also been held that when a public easement has been 
laid out and a right-to-use has arisen, a private easement arises 
therein which constitutes a vested proprietory interest in the lot 
owners, which easement survives extinguishment of any co-existing 
public easement calling for just compensation. Boskovich, Id. at 
437; Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501, 126 P 959 (Utah 1912). 
In this case the elimination of 900 SOuth Street was of 
significant importance to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs Nelson had 
commercial property on a corner in the business district of Provo. 
Their establishment was available to traffic moving north and south 
on University Avenue or east and west on 900 South. 
As previously discussed, Stephen Whitlock owns a parcel of 
property which is now landlocked as a result of closing 900 South. 
Plaintiffs Stephen and Sheila Whitlock have been deprived of 
valuable corner property and 100 East and 900 South, with traffic 
only able to enter their establishment from 100 East. No due 
process was accorded these parties prior to vacating the road and 
no offer of compensation has ever been made. 
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POINT V 
THE RULE THAT A MUNICIPALITY ACQUIRES A LIMITED FEE 
IS NOT A NARROW EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE 
Defendant claims in its brief that "the rule that a 
municipality acquires a determinable fee in the streets of a 
platted subdivision is a narrow exception to the common law." To 
the contrary, the rule is well established in Utah by statute as 
well as by common law. Plaintiff again cites Knight v. Thomas, 
supra., for the proposition. That has been previously briefed in 
Point I C. Defendants argument fails to address the 1884 laws of 
Utah cited by Appellant in its opening brief, which limits the 
right of a municipality to take real property in fee simple title. 
The municipality was not entitled to do that under the laws in 
existance at that time. Section 2071. S 7. CLU 1888, provided "by 
taking or accepting land for a highway, the public acquire only the 
right-of-way, and incidents necessary to enjoin and maintaining it. 
A transfer of land bounded by a highway, passes the title of the 
person whose estate is transferred, to the center of the highway." 
In addition, this Court should note that in Justice Crockett's 
opinion in Sears v. Qgden City, 537 P.2d 1029, 1030, Knight v. 
Thomas, supra., is cited for the proposition "that the board of 
education is the abutting landowner, and thus the land occupied by 
the street would revert to the board of education." Justice Maughn 
cites favorably in Sears v. Qgden City, 572 P. 2d 1359,1363 to Payne 
v. City of Laremy, Wyo, 398 P.2d 557, 562 (1965) for the 
proposition "upon passage of the ordinance vacating the street, the 
city no longer had any title or interest in the premises; and 
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therefore the city had nothing to sell or convey and the quitclaim 
deed was a nullity as to any interests in the roadway dedicated in 
the Argonne Park Plat." 
Chief Justice Wolfe, concurring in Boskovich, supra., stated 
"this Court referred to the interest of the county in a platted 
subdivision as both a determinable or a limited fee and a public 
easement using the terms interchangably." 
Provo City then goes on to state that a rule requiring the 
City to obtain a deed to property it claimed to own in fee simple 
absolute would be unreasonable as the City would have to get a deed 
for a every street it reserved for public use. This is not 
Plaintiffs1 position at all. Plaintiffs1 position clearly is that 
any street laid out and platted, or upon which the public had an 
easment, would continue in such capacity until the easement or 
determinable fee were vacated. At which point it would revert to 
the abutting landowners subject to the equitable principles and 
private easement rules specified herein. Under Plaintiffs1 view, 
the City would be required to get a deed for every street which it 
claimed to own in fee simple absolute and which it later intended 
to vacate, convert to a commercial building cite, and sell without 
any regard to the public or private easements contained therein. 
This position is supported by the express lanquage of the State 
Township Act. 
CONCLUSION 
When this action was initiated it was Plaintiffs1 desires to 
have clear title to the property at issue in this action. Since 
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the property has now been converted to a commercial building site 
and conveyed, Plaintiffs request that title be quieted in 
Plaintiffs to the center of the road, and that the case be remanded 
for a determination of damages. 
In the alternative, Plaintiffs request the Court to hold that 
the act of vacating the street was improper and the vacation is 
invalid. Plaintiffs request the case be remanded to the trial 
court for a determination of Plaintiffs1 private easement rights 
and/or the issue of just compensation for the loss of that 
easement. 
DATED AND SIGNED this J>S day of April, 1993. 
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Ap€orney for the Plaintiffs/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Appellants Reply Brief, postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
GARY GREGERSON 
DAVID C. DIXON 
PROVO CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
351 W. Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84 603 
DATED AND SIGNED this O-f day of April, 1993. 
^t / J» 
nelsbo.rly 
19 
APPENDIX EXHIBIT 1 
THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS. SESS. II. CH. 176, 177. 1867. 541 
last day shall fall on a Sunday, Christmas day, or on any day appointed 
by the President of the United States as a day of public fast or thanks-
giving, or on the Fourth of July, in which case the time shall be reckoned 
exclusive of that day also. 
SEC. 49. And be it further enacted, That all the jurisdiction, power, Jurisdiction of 
and authority conferred upon and vested in the District Court of the United States 
United States by this act in cases in bankruptcy are hereby conferred s^trrictnofhCo-
upon and vested in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and Jnmbia and Ter-
in and upon the supreme courts of the several Territories of the United ntones. 
States, when the bankrupt.resides in the said District of Columbia or in 
either of the said Territories. And in those judicial districts which are j n districts not 
not within any organized circuit of the United States, the power and in organized cir-
jurisdiction of a circuit court in bankruptcy may be exercised by the exe'rdse^ ower 
district judge. of circuit court. 
SEC. 50. And be it further enacted, That this act shall commence and When act to 
take effect as to the appointment of the officers created hereby, and the take e f fec t 
promulgation of rules and general orders, from and after the date of its 
approval: Provided, That no petition or other proceeding under this act Proviso, 
shall be filed, received, or commenced before the first day of June, anno 
Domini, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven. 
APPROVED, March 2, 1867. 
CHAP. CLXXVIL — An Act forth, Relief of the Inhabitants of Cities and Totons March 2,1867.' 
upon the Public'Lands. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever any portion of . T o 5 n autnori-
the public lands of the United States have been or shall be settled upon enter public 
and occupied as a town site, and therefore not subject to entry under the lands occupied 
agricultural pre-emption laws, it shall be lawful, in case such town shall mintmum i^ce* 
be incorporated, for the corporate authorities thereof, and if not incorpor- in trust, &c. 
ated, for the judge of the county court for the county in which such town 
may be situated, to enter at the proper land office, and at the minimum 
price, the land so settled and occupied, in trust for the several use and 
benefit of the occupants thereof, according to their respective interests; 
the execution of which trust, as to the disposal of the lots in such town, Trust, how 
and the proceeds of the sales thereof, to be conducted under such rules executed, 
and regulations as may be prescribed by the legislative authority of the 
State or Territory in which the same may be situated: Provided, That 
the entry of the land intended by this act to be made shall be made, or a Entry, &c. 
declaratory statement of the purpose of the inhabitants to enter it as a whentobe 
town site under this act shall be filed with the register of the proper land ' 
office, prior to the commencement of the public sale of the body of land 
in which it is included, and that the entry or declaratory statement shall *° include 
include only such lands as is actually occupied by the town and the title ' 
to which is in the United States. If upon surveyed lands the entry shall upon sur-
in its exterior limit be made in conformity to the legal subdivisions of the YCVgo()laD|f*5i 
public lands authorized by the act of twenty-fourth April, one thousand Vol. iii. p. 666 
eight hundred and twenty ; and where the inhabitants are in number one 
hundred and less than two hundred, shall embrace not exceeding three 
hundred and twenty acres ; and in cases where the inhabitants of such Amount of 
town are more than two hundred and less than one thousand, shall em- *and tnat may 
brace not exceeding six hundred and forty acres; and where the number 
of inhabitants is one thousand and over one thousand, shall embrace not 
exceeding twelve hundred and eighty acres : Provided, That for each ad- Proviso, 
ditional one thousand inhabitants, not exceeding five thousand in all, a 
further grant of three hundred and twenty acres shall be allowed : And . Where there 
provided further, That in any Territory in which a land office may not ^ t ^ t e ^ te 
have been established, declaratory statements as hereinbefore provided filed where. 
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may be filed with the surveyor-general of the surveying district in which 
the lands are situate, who shall transmit said declaratory statement to the 
Certain acts general land office: And provided, further, That any act of said trus-
of trustees to be
 t e e s n o t made in conformity to the rules and regulations herein alluded to 
Regulations, shall be void ; effect to be given to the foregoing provisions according to 
such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior: 
And provided farther, That the provisions of this act shall not apply to 
military or other reservations heretofore made by the United States, nor 
to reservations for lighthouses, custom-houses, mints, or such other public 
purposes as the interests of the United States may require, whether held 
under reservations through the land office by title derived from the Crown 
of Spain, or otherwise: And provided further, That no title shall be ac-
quired, under the provisions of this act, to any mine of gold, silver, cinna-
bar, or copper. 
APPROVED, March 2, 1867. 
This act not 
to apply to cer-
tain reserva-
tions ; 
nor to mines 
of gold, &c. 
March 2,1867. CHAP. CLXXVIIL — An Act allowing the Duties on foreign Merchandise imported 
into the Port of Albany to be secured and paid at that Place. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled^ That Albany, in the State of 
New York, and within the collection district of New York, be, and is 
hereby, declared to be a port of delivery within the aforesaid district; and 
there shall be appointed a surveyor of customs, to reside at 6aid port, who 
shall, in addition to the customary duties performed by that officer in 
other places, perform the duties prescribed in an act entitled " An act al-
lowing the foreign merchandise imported into Pittsburg, Wheeling, Cin-
cinnati, Louisville, Saint Louis, Nashville, and Natchez, to be secured 
and paid at those places," approved March two, eighteen hundred and 
thirty-one. ' The said surveyor, before taking the oath of office, shall give 
security to the United States for the faithful performance of his duties in 
the sum of ten thousand dollars, and shall receive, in addition to the cus-
tomary fees and emoluments of his office, an annual salary of six hundred 
dollars. 
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted. That the same privileges granted to 
the ports of delivery mentioned in the first section of this act, and the 
restrictions created by the said act, are hereby extended and made appli-
cable to all goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the United 
States at any port of entry and destined to said port of Albany. 
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted. That the Secretary of the Treasury 
shall be, and he is hereby, authorized to extend the privileges of the 
warehouse acts of August six, eighteen hundred and forty-six, and March 
twenty-eight, eighteen hundred and fifty-four, and the regulations of the 
Treasury Department relating thereto, to the said port of Albany. 
APPROVED, March 2, 1867. 
Albany, New 
York, made a 
port of delivery. 
Surveyor. 
1831, ch. 87. 
Vol. iv. p. 480. 
Bond, fees, and 
salary. 
Privileges and 
restrictions ap-
plicable. 
Privileges of 
former acts, &c. 
extended to this 
port. 
1846, ch. 84. 
Vol. ix. p. 53. 
1854, ch. 30. 
Vol. x. p. 270. 
March 2, 1867. 
Snrveyor-gen-
eral for Montana. 
Salary and da-
ties. 
Clerk hire, 
office rent, and 
fuel. 
Montana and 
Arizona land 
districts estab-
lished. 
CHAP. CLXXIX. — An Act to create the Office of Surveyor-General in the Territory oj 
Montana, and establish a Land Office in the Territories of Montana and Arizona. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That the President, by the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, shall be, and he is hereby, authorized to 
appoint a surveyor-general for Montana, whose annual salary shall be 
three thousand dollars, and whose power, authority, and duties shall be 
the same as those provided by law for the surveyor-general of Oregon. 
He shall have proper allowances for clerk hire, office rent and fuel, what 
is now allowed by law to the surveyor-general of Oregon. 
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the public lands within the 
Territories of Montana and Arizona, to which the Indian title is or shall 
be extinguished, shall each respectively constitute a new land district to 
APPENDIX EXHIBIT 2 
elusive of the improvements thereon made by the 
claimant or his grantors, and the value of such im-
provements The issues joined thereon must be tried 
as in law actions and the value of the real estate and 
of such improvements must be separately ascertained 
on the trial WW 
57-6-3 Rights of parties — Acquiring other's in-
terest or hold as tenants in common 
The plaintiff in the main action mav thereupon pay 
the appraised value of the improvements and take 
the property but should he fail to do so after a rea 
sonable time to be fixed by the court the defendant 
may take the property upon paying its value exclu 
sive of the improvements If this is not done within a 
reasonable time to be fixed by the court the parties 
will be held to be tenants in common of all the real 
estate including the improvements each holding an 
interest proportionate to the values ascertained on 
the trial 1953 
57-6-4. Certain persons deemed to hold under 
color of title. 
A purchaser in good faith at any judicial or tax sale 
made by the proper person or officer has color of title 
within the meaning of this chapter whether such 
person or officer has sufficient authority to sell or not 
unless such want of authority was known to such pur-
chaser at the time of the sale and any person has 
color of title who has occupied a tract of real estate by 
himself or by those under whom he claims for the 
term of five years or who has thus occupied it for less 
time if he or those under whom he claims, have at 
any time during such occupancy with the knowledge 
or consent express or implied, of the real owner made 
any valuable improvements thereon, or if he or those 
under whom he claims have at any time during such 
occupancy paid the ordinary county taxes thereon for 
any one year and two years have elapsed without a 
repayment of the same by the owner thereof and 
such occupancy is continued up to the time at which 
the action is brought by which the recovery of the 
real estate is obtained and his rights shall pass to his 
assignees or representatives but nothing in this 
chapter shall be construed to give tenants color of 
title against their landlords 1953 
57-6-5 Settlers under state or federal law or 
contract deemed occupying claimants 
When any person has settled upon any real estate 
and occupied the same for three years under or by 
virtue of any law or contract with the proper officers 
of the state for the purchase thereof or under any law 
of or by virtue of any purchase from the United 
States and shall have made valuable improvements 
thereon and shall be found not to be the owner 
thereof or not to have acquired a right to purchase 
the same from the state or the United States such 
person shall be an occupying claimant within the 
meaning of this chapter 1953 
57-6-6 Setoff a g a i n s t claim for i m p r o v e m e n t s . 
In the cases above provided for if the occupying 
claimant has committed any injury to the real estate 
by cutting timber or otherwise the plaintiff may set 
the same off against any claim for improvements 
made by the claimant 1&53 
57-6-7. When execution on judgment of posses-
sion may issue. 
The plaintiff in the main action is entitled to an 
execution to put him in possession of his property in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter, but 
not otherwise ™™ 
57-6-8. Improvements made by occupants ol 
land granted to state 
Any person having improvements on any real es 
tate granted to the state in aid of any work of internal 
improvement, whose title thereto is questioned by an 
other, may remove such improvements without m 
jury otherwise to such real estate, at any time befoi 1 
he is evicted therefrom, or he may claim and have th 
benefit of this chapter by proceeding as herein d 
rected i»> 
CHAPTER 7 
TOWNSITES 
Section 
57-7-1 Disposition of lots to persons entitled at 
ter entry 
57-7-2 Notice of entry 
57-7-3 Claims to lots to be filed — Time and 
place 
57-7 4 Adverse claims — Determination 
57-7-5 Proof of claims when no adverse clam 
advanced 
57-7 6 Conveyance and deed to proper claim 
ant 
57-7 7 When judge is claimant of lands 
57-7 8 When city or town officer is claimant ol 
lands 
57-7-9 Change of venue 
57-7 10 Statement of expenses 
57-7-11 Payment to be made before conveyance 
57-7-12 Full payment to be made within s \ 
months — Lien for nonpayment 
Sale to satisfy 
57 7 13 Errors in measurement or computation 
57 7 14 Death of officer — Authority to complt u 
trust vests in successor 
57-7-15 Disposition of unclaimed lands 
57-7-16 Sale of unclaimed lands 
57 7-17 Reservation of lands for public uses 
57 7 18 Disposition of proceeds of sales 
57-7 19 Possession for ten years entitles claim 
ant to conveyance 
57-7-1. Disposition of lots to persons entitled af 
ter entry. 
When the corporate authorities of any city or town 
or the district judge of any county in which any city 
or town may be situated, shall have entered at the 
proper land office the land or any part of the land 
settled and occupied as the site of such city or tow n 
pursuant to and by virtue of the provisions of the Ac t 
of Congress entitled "An act for the relief of the in 
habitants of cities and towns upon the public land^ 
approved March 2, 1867, and acts amendatory thereof 
and supplementary thereto, it shall be the duty ol 
such corporate authorit ies or judge, as the case ma, 
be, to dispose of and convey the title to such land 0/ 
to the several blocks, lots, parcels or shares thereof U 
the persons entitled thereto, who shall be ascertained 
as hereinafter prescribed 190 j 
57-7-2. Notice of entry 
Within thirty days after the entry of any such land 
the corporate authorit ies or judge entering the same 
shall give public notice of the entry in at least five 
public places within such city or town, and shall pub 
lish the notice in some newspaper printed and pub 
lished in this state and having a general circulation 
xnjrLU &Olt\LKj 106 
in such city or town. The notice shall be published 
once a week for at least three successive months, and 
shall contain an accurate description of the lands so 
entered as stated in the certificate of entry or the 
duplicate receipt received from the officer of the land 
office. i»M 
57-7-3. Claims to lots to be filed — Time and 
place. 
Every person claiming any lot or parcel of such 
land shall, within six months after the first publica-
tion of the notice, in person or by his agent or attor-
ney, sign a statement in writing containing an accu-
rate description of the particular lot or parcel of land 
in which he claims to have an interest and the spe-
cific right, interest or estate therein which he claims 
to be entitled to receive, and he shall deliver the same 
to the clerk of the district court of the county in which 
such city or town is situated. Such clerk shall enter 
the statements in a book to be kept for that purpose, 
and shall file and preserve them in his office, noting 
the day of filing The filing of each statement shall be 
considered notice to all persons claiming any interest 
in the lands described therein of the claim of the 
party filing the same, and any person failing to make 
and deliver a statement within the time limited in 
this section shall be forever barred of the right of 
claiming or recovering such land, or any interest or 
estate therein or in any part thereof, in any court; 
provided, that when good cause is shown why such 
statement could not be filed within the time herein 
specified the judge may extend the time, not exceed-
ing one year from the first publication of such notice. 
1953 
57-7-4. A d v e r s e c la ims — Determinat ion . 
If a t the expiration of six months after the first 
publication of such notice it shall be found by the 
s ta tements filed that there are adverse c la imants to 
any lot or parcel of land, it shall be the duty of the 
district judge, taking up each case in the order of 
filing, to cause notice to be served upon the claimants 
thereto, or their agents or at torneys, to appear before 
the district court and prosecute their claims upon a 
day to be appointed by the court, not less than five 
nor more than thir ty days from the service of such 
notice. The s ta tements filed as aforesaid shall stand 
in the place of pleadings, and an issue may be made 
thereon. On the day set for the hear ing the court 
shall proceed to hear the evidence adduced in support 
of the allegations of the part ies and shall decide ac-
cording to the justice of the case. lesa 
57-7-5. Proof of claims when no adverse claim 
advanced. 
After the expiration of the six months for filing 
s ta tements , if there are no adverse claimants , the 
court, tak ing up the cases in the order of filing, shall 
cause a summons to be issued and served upon each 
party filing a s ta tement , or his agent, requir ing him 
to appear before the court upon a day designated, not 
less than three nor more than ten days from the ser-
vice of such summons and make proof of his s tate-
ment. 1953 
57-7-6. C o n v e y a n c e and deed to proper claim-
ant. 
Where the entry of the townsite shall have been 
made by the district judge the conveyance shall be 
made by him in accordance with the judgment en-
tered. Where the corporate author i t ies shall have 
made the entry the court shall certify its judgment to 
the city commissioners or mayor of the city, or to the 
president of the board of trustees of the town, who 
shall accordingly make to the party c la imant the 
proper deed. 1&&3 
57-7-7. When j u d g e is c la imant of l ands . 
If the district judge shall be a c la imant of lands in 
any city or town in his county, he may file the s ta te-
ment required in Section 57-7-3 in the district court 
of an adjoining district, and a copy of the statement in 
that of his own county. The judge of the district court 
of the adjoining county shall then proceed as provided 
for in Section 57-7-4 or 57-7-5, as the case may be; 
and he shall , moreover, give notice to the city com-
missioners or mayor of such city or the president of 
the board of t rus tees of such town, or, in case of an 
unincorporated town, to the just ice court judge of the 
precinct in which such town may be s i tuated. The 
court shall thereafter proceed as in o ther cases pro-
vided for in this t i t le, and a deed to the land shall be 
made to the party entit led thereto . 1990 
57-7-8. When city or town officer is claimant of 
lands. 
If a city commissioner or the mayor of any city or 
the president of the board of t rus tees of any town 
shall he a c la imant of lands in such city or town, the 
recorder or the clerk thereof, as the case may be, 
shall , upon the certificate of the distr ict court made 
as in the case of other c la imants , execute a deed of 
conveyance to such c la imant for the lands finally ad-
judged to him by the court. 1953 
57-7-9. Change of v e n u e . 
A change of venue as in actions a t law shall be 
allowed in all cases arising under this title. 1953 
57-7-10. S ta tement of e x p e n s e s . 
Within thi r ty days after the expiration of the six 
months prescribed in Section 57-7-3 for filing state-
ments the corporate author i t ies , or the judge, and the 
board of county commissioners shall render in writ-
ing a true account of all moneys expended in the ac-
quisition of the tit le to the land and in the adminis-
tration or execution of the t rus t up to tha t t ime, in-
cluding purchase money, necessary t ravel ing ex-
penses, and the costs for posting and publ ishing no-
tices. Such account shall be filed in the office of the 
clerk of the district court of the county in which such 
city or town may be si tuated, and shall dur ing ordi-
nary business hours be open for inspection to all per-
sons interested. 1953 
57-7-11. P a y m e n t to be m a d e before c o n v e y -
ance. 
Before the corporate author i t ies or judge shall be 
required to execute, acknowledge or deliver any deed 
of conveyance to any person adjudged to be entitled 
thereto such person shall pay or tender to the city 
commissioners, the mayor, the president of the board 
of t rustees or the judge, as the case may be, the sum 
of money chargeable on the land to be conveyed by 
such deed. To ascertain the sum chargeable, s t ree ts 
and public grounds must be deducted from all the 
land entered, and then such sum shall be the propor-
tionate costs of the land conveyed and the proportion-
ate expenses thereof, with interest together with a 
reasonable charge for the preparation, execution and 
acknowledgment of the deed. 1953 
57-7-12. Full payment to be made within six 
months — Lien for nonpayment — Sale 
to satisfy. 
Full payment for land shall be made to the district 
judge, the city commissioners, the mayor or the presi-
dent of the board of trustees, as the case may be, 
within six months after the certificate is issued to the 
claimant. In case of nonpayment within the time 
herein specified, the amount due shall be deemed a 
judgment lien upon the land claimed, and the judge, 
the city commissioners, the mayor or the president of 
the board of trustees, as the case may be, shall pro-
ceed to sell it by sheriffs safe in the same manner as 
land is sold under execution, subject, however, to re-
demption as provided by law. 1953 
57-7-13, Errors in measurement or computa-
tion. 
Errors in measurement or computation shall not 
invalidate any proceedings under this title. 1953 
57-7-14. Death of officer — Authority to com-
plete trust vests in successor. 
In case of death or disability of the district judge, 
the city commissioners, the mayor or the president of 
the board of trustees before the complete execution of 
the trust, the same shall vest in their successors in 
office. WW 
57-7-15. Dispos i t ion of unc la imed lands . 
If there shall remain any unclaimed lands within 
such city or town after the expiration of six months 
from the publication of the notice provided for in Sec-
tion 57-7-2, the city commissioners, the mayor or the 
president of the board of t rus tees , in cases where 
lands have been entered for a municipal corporation, 
or the district judge, in cases where lands have been 
entered in t rus t by him, shall cause the same to be 
surveyed and platted into sui table blocks, lots, s t reets 
and a))eys. A certified p)at of such surveyed lands 
shall be filed for record in the office of the county 
recorder of the county. 1953 
57-7-16. Sale of unclaimed lands. 
The city commissioners, the mayor, the president of 
the board of trustees or district judge may sell or 
cause to be sold such blocks or lots at public auction 
to the highest bidder for cash, after public notice of 
the time and place of such sale published at least 
forty days in some newspaper published in the 
county, if there is any, otherwise in a newspaper hav-
ing general circulation in the county. If any of such 
lands remain unsold for want of a bidder, the city 
commissioners, the mayor, the president of the board 
of trustees or district judge may sell or cause the 
same to be sold at public or private sale, on such 
terms as may be deemed for the best interest of the 
city or town; provided, that none of such lands shall 
be sold for less than $5 per acre. 1953 
57-7-17, Reservation of lands for public uses. 
Lots or parcels of land necessary for streets, public 
squares, parks, schoolhouses, hospitals, asylums, fire 
engine and hose houses, pesthouses, state or other 
public buildings, or public use, may be reserved by 
the city commissioners, the mayor, the president of 
the board of trustees or the district judge, as the case 
may be; and he may execute and deliver to the proper 
party a deed for any property set aside for such pur-
poses. 1953 
57-7-18. Disposition of proceeds of sales. 
All moneys arising from the sale of lands, after 
deducting the costs and charges of such sales, shall be 
paid into the city or town treasury in cases where 
such lands have been entered in trust by corporate 
authority, or into the county treasury in cases where 
such lands have been entered in trust by the district 
judge; and the same shall be set apart and applied by 
the city commissioners or city council, or by the board 
of trustees of an incorporated town, or by the board of 
county commissioners in case of an unincorporated 
town, for the improvement of public squares and 
streets, the construction of sewers or procuring a sup-
ply of water for the use and benefit of the inhabitants 
of the city or town. 19W 
57-7-19. Posses s ion for ten years en t i t l e s claim-
ant to conveyance. 
Whenever any lot, piece or parcel of land shall have 
passed from the United States to the district judge of 
any county in this s ta te or to the probate judge of any 
county in the late terri tory of Utah, under and by 
virtue of the provisions of an Act of Congress entitled 
"An act for the relief of the inhabi tants of cities and 
towns upon the public lands," approved March 2, 
1867, or any amendments thereto, and there is no 
record of any conveyance from such judge or his suc-
cessor in office to the claimants thereof, any person, 
who by himself or by or through his predecessors in 
interest shall have had continuous and exclusive pos-
session of such lot, piece or parcel of land for the pe-
riod often years before the filing of the petition here-
inafter mentioned and who shall have paid the taxes 
thereon during said time, shall be deemed the right-
ful owner of such land, and it shall be conclusively 
presumed that he has complied with all of the provi-
sions of law for obtaining title thereto; and such per-
son may at any time apply to the judge of the district 
court of the county wherein said land may be situated 
for a conveyance of the legal title to such land to him, 
and such judge of the district court is hereby vested 
with power and authori ty to execute such conveyance 
and carry out the trust , and he shall execute a con-
veyance to such person of such lot, piece or parcel of 
land without any expense to such person, except the 
ordinary costs of court. Such conveyance, when so ex-
ecuted by any judge of the district court, shall pass to 
such person all the right, title and interest so held in 
trust to such lot, piece or parcel of land to all intents 
and purposes and with the same effect as if a proper 
conveyance had been executed after proper proceed-
ings in the manner provided by law. 1953 
CHAPTER 8 
CONDOMINIUM OWNERSHIP ACT 
Section 
57-8-1. Short title. 
57-8-2. Applicability of chapter. 
57-8-3. Definitions. 
57-8-4. S ta tus of the units . 
57-8-5. Recognized tenancy relationships. 
57-8-6. Ownership and possession rights. 
57-8-7. Common areas and facilities. 
57-8-8. Compliance with covenants, bylaws 
and/or house rules and administra-
tive provisions. 
57-8-9. Certain work prohibited. 
57-8-10. Contents of declaration. 
57-8-11. Contents of deeds of units. 
57-8-12. Recording. 
57-8-13. Record of survey map to be recorded. 
57-8-13.2. Conversion of convertible land —-
Amendment to declaration — Limi-
tations. 
57-8-13.4. Conversion of convertible space — 
Amendment to declaration — Limi-
tations. 
57-8-13.6. Expansion of project. 
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movement following him, including Lydia 
M. Child's, Against Capital Punishment, of 
1842,15 has continued to the present day. 
Twelve of our sister states have abolished 
capital punishment. Their names and dates 
of abolition are: Alaska (1957); Hawaii 
(1957); Iowa (1965); Maine (1887); Michi-
gan (1847); Minnesota (1911); North Dako-
ta (1915); Oregon (1964); Rhode Island 
(1852); Vermont (1965); West Virginia 
(1965); and Wisconsin (1853).16 
Numerous statistical studies have been 
made comparing contiguous states with 
similar populations, and comparable politi-
cal, social and economic structures. Some 
of these states have lacked, some have re-
tained capital punishment; but the homi-
cide rates remain the same and have sus-
tained trends over long periods of time; 
irrespective of the use or non-use of the 
capital sanction.17 If it is deterrence we 
look for, we do not find it in the death 
penalty. Are we in Utah more in need of a 
death penalty than the citizens of the sister 
states mentioned above? 
Although great discretion is conferred on 
the legislative body to determine what 
measures and means are reasonably neces-
sary for the protection of the interests of 
the public, the reasonableness of the means 
selected must be judged within the context 
of the uniqueness of the penalty prescribed. 
The death penalty attains a degree of arbi-
trariness, because it has no real and sub-
stantial relation to the objects sought to be 
attained, viz., deterrence and protection of 
society. In contrast, there is no doubt life 
is an inherent and fundamental right. The 
only rationalization to support the power of 
the state to exact the death penalty is ven-
geance. Revenge is not a function of the 
law. 
The legitimate and substantial purpose of 
the state to protect society and deter homi-
15. Annals of America, Vol. 7, p. 66. 
16. Of these states Rhode Island and Vermont 
retain the death penalty for first degree murder 
only in specifically restricted situations, viz., 
while in confinement (Rhode Island); for a 
second unrelated offense, prison personnel, law 
cide can be achieved by restraint, a narrow-
er means than obliteration of a human life. 
Therefore, the death penalty violates due 
process of law, as an arbitrary, unreason-
able, and ineffectual method to achieve the 
desired purpose. 
Were there some way to restore the be-
reaved and wounded survivors, and the vic-
tims, to what was once theirs; there could 
then be justification for the capital sanc-
tion. Sadly, such is not available to us. 
( O I KEYNUMBERSYSTEM> 
2 fT> r>nrr> AJ^J *f 
M. L. SEARS, Joseph Behling, Frank A. 
Salimeno, Robert G. Hartmann, and 
James L. Lavender, on behalf of them-
selves and all other taxpayers similarly 
situated, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
OGDEN CITY, a body politic, Mayor A. 
Stephen Dirks, Council of Ogden City, 
and Donna Adams, Ogden City Record-
er, Defendants and Respondents. 
M. L. SEARS et al., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
OGDEN CITY, Defendant. 
No. 14986. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 8, 1977. 
Actions brought by taxpayers and 
property owners against city and board of 
enforcement officer in performance of duty 
(Vermont). In Vermont the penalty may be 
death or life imprisonment. See: CBS Alma-
nac 1976. 
17. Encyc. Brit., Note 10, supra. 
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education for declaration that ordinance va-
cating street was invalid and to enjoin clos-
ing of street were consolidated for trial. 
The Second District Court, Weber County, 
G. Hal Taylor, J., rendered judgment of no 
cause for action against plaintiffs, and 
plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Maughan, J., held that plaintiffs, who did 
not allege or show fraud or collusion and 
who had not suffered special injury differ-
ent in kind from that suffered by the pub-
lic, had no standing to challenge ordinance 
and (2) upon termination of city's interest, 
underlying fee reverted to board as sole 
abutting property owner along vacated 
street. 
Affirmed. 
1. Municipal Corporations <s=»657(2) 
Authority to vacate streets, when exer-
cised in the general public interest, is a 
legislative power vested in municipal corpo-
rations. U.C.A.1953, 10-8-8.1. 
2. Municipal Corporations <s=» 657(5), 
1000(5) 
In a proceeding to set aside a street 
vacation order, a complainant should allege 
that by reason of closing street he has suf-
fered special damage different in kind from 
damage to general public; however, a tax-
payer is not required to show special dam-
age or injury where right to relief is 
grounded on illegal acts claimed to operate 
as constructive fraud affecting city and its 
citizens. 
3. Municipal Corporations <s=> 1000(4) 
Where there was no allegation or evi-
dence of fraud or collusion, and none of 
plaintiff taxpayers and property owners 
had suffered special injury different in kind 
from that of public in general since their 
property did not abut on street to be vacat-
ed nor was their access substantially im-
paired, plaintiffs had no standing to chal-
lenge ordinance of city, which performed 
legislative function in weighing public ben-
efit of ordinance, that vacated street, title 
and interest to which was conveyed by quit-
claim deed to city board of education, the 
sole abutting property owner. U.C.A.1953, 
10-&-S.1. 
4. Municipal Corporations <s=» 663(2) 
Where board of education was sole 
abutting property owner along vacated 
street, fee interest in street reverted to 
board without deed from city upon vacation 
and any private easements other property 
owners had were not reversionary interests 
entitling them to the underlying fee. U.C. 
A.1953, 10-8-S.5. 
5. Municipal Corporations <s=>871 
City, which did not own underlying fee 
in vacated street, had no proprietary inter-
est in property and was not entitled to 
compensation, and thus city's giving of 
quitclaim deed to vacated street, which had 
been appraised at $13,300, to board of edu-
cation, which as consideration undertook to 
construct storm sewer along vacated street 
at estimated cost of $36,200, was not sub-
ject to challenge as a sham or gift of public 
property to board. 
Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for plaintiffs and 
appellants. 
Timothy W. Blackburn, Richard W. 
Campbell, Ogden, for defendants and re-
spondents. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment in fa-
vor of defendants concerning the vacation 
of a street in Ogden, Utah. Plaintiffs are 
taxpayers, and two are owners of real prop-
erty in the Argonne Park subdivision. We 
affirm. Costs to respondents. All statuto-
ry references are to U.C.A.1953. 
The inception of this conflict was a peti-
tion in which the defendant, Board of Edu-
cation of Ogden, as the sole abutting prop-
erty owner, along 29th Street between Har-
SEARS v. ( 
Cite as 5; 
rison Boulevard and Tyler Avenue, request-
ed vacation of the street by defendant, Og-
den City. The street bisects the campus of 
Ogden High School, and the students to 
move from one area to the other must cross 
the street. 
The City Council accepted the petition 
and referred it to the Planning Commission 
for study. After considering the reports 
and recommendations from the administra-
tive personnel, the council adopted a pro-
posed ordinance vacating the street. The 
matter was set for a public hearing, and the 
council ordered publication of notice of the 
hearing and the proposed ordinance. Sub-
sequently, a public hearing was held, where 
the opponents and proponents expressed 
their views. After consideration of all the 
issues, the council passed the ordinance va-
cating the street. The ordinance was there-
after published and became effective April 
20, 1976. 
The city and board entered into an agree-
ment for the purchase of the vacated street. 
As consideration, the board undertook to 
construct a storm sewer along the vacated 
street; the estimated cost of this work was 
$36,200. The value of the vacated area was 
appraised at $13,300. Thereafter, the city 
conveyed by quit claim deed whatever 
right, title, or interest it had in the vacated 
street to the board. 
Plaintiffs then filed a complaint against 
the city seeking a declaration that the ordi-
nance was invalid and enjoining the closing 
of the street. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed 
an action against the board seeking similar 
relief. The two actions were consolidated 
for trial, and a judgment of no cause for 
action was rendered against plaintiffs. 
The city's interest in the vacated street 
was derived from three sources. Only the 
northern third of its width was part of the 
platted subdivision of Argonne Park, the 
streets of which were dedicated to the pub-
lic. Of the remaining width, the western 
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half of the length was platted and dedicat-
ed as Corbett's Addition. The eastern half 
was quit claimed to the city by Ralph E. 
Hoag Company for perpetual use as a 
street. Corbett's Addition consisted of the 
block between 29th and 30th streets, which 
is completely owned by the board; this 
addition was vacated in 1904. The Hoag 
property was not part of a platted subdivi-
sion. 
The Argonne Park subdivision was dedi-
cated in 1921 and consisted of five blocks. 
Blocks 1 and 4 were located in the area 
between 28th and 29th streets, these are 
owned by the board and are occupied by the 
northern half of the campus. Blocks 2 and 
5 are divided by Kershaw Street and are 
located in the block east of the school. 
Block 3 is situated on the west of Polk 
Avenue. There are sixty-five homes on 
blocks 2, and 3, and 5. Thus the two plain-
tiffs who own property in Argonne Park 
are neither abutting property owners on the 
vacated street nor are they deprived of 
access to their property by the vacation. 
Plaintiffs challenge the validity of the 
ordinance on the ground the city did not 
comply with the notice provisions in Sec. 
10-8-8.4, U.C.A.1953, and that the vacation 
was not in the best interest of the general 
public. 
[1] There are certain basic principles to 
be applied in assessing plaintiffs' claim. 
The authority to vacate streets, when exer-
cised in the general public interest, is a 
legislative power vested in municipal corpo-
rations.1 
Section 10-8-8.1, U.C.A.1953, provides: 
On petition by a person owning a lot in 
the city, praying that a street 
be vacated . . the governing body 
of such a city, upon hearing, and upon 
being satisfied that there is good cause 
for such . vacation 
that it will not be detrimental to the 
general interest, and that it should be 
1. 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd Ed. Revised) § 30.185, p. 97. 
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made, may declare by ordinance such 
street . . . vacated . . . 
When such legislative authority is chal-
lenged, the applicable principle is: 
Apart from arbitrary action or clear 
abuse of discretion, or fraud or collusion, 
or unless there occurs an invasion of 
property rights, the propriety or necessity 
of vacating a street, are matters within 
the discretion of the municipal authori-
ties, which will not be inquired into by 
the courts. Faithfulness to the public 
trust reposed in the members of the legis-
lative body will be presumed. . . 2 
One who will be specially injured, but 
not others may sue to enjoin the vacation 
of a street or alley, where unlawful, but 
not if the proceedings are regular and the 
remedy at law by an action for damages 
is adequate. . 3 
If the street directly in front of one's 
property is not vacated but the portion 
vacated is in another block, so that he 
may use an intersecting cross street, it is 
almost universally held that he does not 
suffer a special injury as entitles him to 
damages. And this is so notwithstanding 
the new route is less convenient or the 
diversion of travel depreciates the value 
of his property. The inconvenience to the 
lot owner in having to adopt a less direct 
route to reach certain points, it has fre-
quently been said, is an injury of the 
same kind as that suffered by the general 
public. If means of ingress and egress 
are not cut off or lessened in the block of 
the abutting owner, but only rendered 
less convenient because of being less di-
rect to other points in the city, and made 
so by the vacation of the street in another 
block, such consequence is damnum abs-
que injuria. . . . 4 
2. Id. §30.187, p. 116. 
3. Id. § 30.200, p. 142. 
4. Id. § 30.194, pp. 129-130. 
5. Id. § 30.207, p. 157. 
[2] In a proceeding to set aside a vaca-
tion order, a complainant should allege that 
by reason of closing the street he has suf-
fered special damages different in kind 
from the damage to the general public. 
However, a taxpayer is not required to 
show special damage or injury where the 
right to relief is grounded on illegal acts of 
the council claimed to operate as a construc-
tive fraud affecting the city and its citi-
zens.5 
[3] In applying the foregoing principles 
to this action, the trial court ruled correctly, 
for the plaintiffs had no standing to chal-
lenge the ordinance. There was no allega-
tion or evidence of fraud or collusion. The 
city performed a legislative function when 
they weighed the public benefit of the ordi-
nance. The courts may not delve into the 
wisdom of a legislative act; it is only where 
there is no possible benefit to the public 
that the courts will review such a legisla-
tive determination. In Tuttle v. Sowadzki,* 
this court stated: 
It is elementary, however, 
that a person cannot object to the vaca-
tion of a highway if he has no other 
interest therein save as one of the public. 
None of the plaintiffs has suffered a special 
injury different in kind to the public in 
general, and, therefore, none has standing 
to challenge the vacation, viz., those whose 
property does not abut on the street to be 
vacated or whose access is not substantially 
impaired have no standing to challenge a 
procedurally correct vacation.7 
Plaintiffs' claim of procedural infirmity is 
predicated on the provision in Sec. 10-8-8.4, 
requiring publication for four consecutive 
weeks prior to an action on a petition or 
6. 41 Utah 501, 514, 126 P. 959, 964 (1912). 
7. Banchero v. City Council of the City of Seat-
tle, 2 Wash.App. 519, 468 P.2d 724 (1970); 
Hoskins v. Kirkland, 7 Wash.App. 957, 503 
P.2d 1117 (1972); Clifford v. City of Cheyenne, 
Wyo., 487 P.2d 1325 (1971). 
SEARS v. < 
Cite as 5: 
intention to vacate. The notice provisions 
of section 8.4 are specifically declared inap-
plicable in the situation set forth in Sec. 
10-8-8.3. The latter section states that the 
notice of the intention of the governing 
body to vacate is not required, where there 
is written consent by the owners of the 
property abutting the part of the street 
proposed to be vacated. 
The plaintiffs, who are owners of proper-
ty in Argonne Park subdivision, claim the 
city's quit claim deed to the board was null 
and void and was an attempt to deprive 
them of their "reversionary interests" in 
the vacated street. 
[4] This court has held that the interest 
a municipal body acquires in the streets in a 
platted subdivision is a determinable fee. 
Upon vacation by the governing authorities, 
the fee reverts to the abutting property 
owner.8 Since the board was the sole abut-
ting property owner along the vacated 
street, the fee interest would revert thereto 
without a deed from the city. 
Section 10-8-8.5, U.C.A.1953, provides 
that the action of the governing body va-
cating a street, which has been dedicated to 
the public use by the proprietor, shall oper-
ate to the extent to which it is vacated as a 
revocation of the acceptance thereof and 
the relinquishment of the city's fee therein 
by the governing body. 
Thus the acceptance of dedication of the 
northern third of the street to the public 
use by the platting of the Argonne Park 
Subdivision was revoked by the ordinance. 
When the board acquired the fee to the 
land abutting the street, there was a pre-
8. White v. Salt Lake City, 121 Utah 134, 239 
P.2d 210 (1952). 
9. Fenton v. Ceder Lumber & Hardware Compa-
ny, 17 Utah 2d 99, 404 P.2d 966 (1965). 
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sumption that the conveyance included the 
fee to the highway center line subject to 
the public right of way (determinable fee).9 
Upon passage of the ordinance vacating the 
street, the city no longer had any title or 
interest in the premises; and, therefore, the 
city had nothing to sell or convey and the 
quit claim deed was a nullity as to any 
interest in the roadway dedicated in the 
Argonne Park plat.10 However, these con-
sequences are of no benefit to plaintiffs, 
since the fee interest reverted to the abut-
ting property owner, the board. 
Plaintiffs further urge that the quit 
claim deed constituted a gift of public prop-
erty to the board and that the alleged con-
sideration was a sham. 
[5] When a street is vacated and the 
municipality does not own the underlying 
fee, the municipality has no proprietary in-
terest in the property and is not entitled to 
compensation.11 
The asserted "reversionary interests" 
claimed by the two plaintiffs, who are prop-
erty owners in Argonne Park, are predicat-
ed on certain language in Boskovich v. Mid-
vale City Corp}2 
. . . We have held . . . that 
if the dedicated streets of a subdivision 
are laid out and right to the use thereof 
has arisen, a private easement arises 
therein which constitutes a vested pro-
prietary interest in the lot owners, which 
easement survives extinguishment of any 
co-existing public easement calling for 
just compensation. . 
Section 10-8-8.5, U.C.A.1953, expressly 
provides that the action of a governing 
11. Puget Sound Alumni of Kappa Sigma v. City 
of Seattle, 70 Wash.2d 222, 422 P.2d 799 
(1967); 11 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 
(3rd Ed. Rev.) § 30.189, p. 123. 
10. Payne v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 398 P.2d 
557, 562 (1965). 
12. 121 Utah 445, 243 P.2d 435, 437 (1952). 
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body vacating a street shall not impair the 
right of way and easements therein, if any, 
of any lot owner. 
The board has made no attempt to close 
the vacated street and thus interfere with 
any private easements.13 The trial court 
concluded as a matter of law: 
"The private rights, if any, of the own-
ers of property in the Argonne Subdivi-
sion are not concluded or determined by 
these Findings, Conclusions or Judg-
ment." 
Whatever private easements the property 
owners of Argonne Park might have, they 
are certainly not the type of reversionary 
interests which plaintiffs claim. The claim 
was that upon termination of the city's 
determinable fee, the underlying fee revert-
ed to the owners in Argonne Park rather 
than the abutting fee holder, the board. 
The asserted consequence thereof was to 
deprive them of property without due proc-
ess of law and to condemn property without 
a proceeding in eminent domain. This 
claim is without merit. 
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, WIL-
KINS and HALL, JJ., concur. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
13. This court has never expressly ruled on the 
extent of the easement acquired when one re-
ceives a conveyance which describes the prop-
erty sold by reference to a plat or map upon 
which the streets and alleys are shown. There 
are three divergent views as to the extent of 
this right and to the granting of relief against 
Margaret S. MINEfiR, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The BOARD OF REVIEW OF the 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of 
Utah, Defendant. 
Robert W. ROSKELLEY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, Defendant. 
Nos. 14696 and 14728. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 12, 1977. 
In two cases it was found by the Indus-
trial Commission that unemployment com-
pensation claimants had knowingly failed to 
report work and earnings during times they 
claimed to be unemployed and without 
earnings. Claimants were assessed disqual-
ification and repayment of benefits. In an 
original proceeding for review; the Supreme 
Court, Hall, J., held that: (1) intention to 
defraud was shown by the claims them-
selves; (2) the statutory disqualification pe-
riod was to be retroactive, and (3) the pro-
visions for disqualification and repayment 
did not offend due process or equal protec-
tion. 
Affirmed. 
Crockett, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
Maughan, J., dissented and filed state-
ment. 
1. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<s=*731 
Intention to obtain unemployment com-
pensation benefits fraudulently was shown 
obstruction. See 7 A.L.R.2d 607, Anno.: Con-
veyance of lot with reference to plat or map as 
giving purchaser rights in indicated streets, al-
leys, or areas not abutting his lot, § 2, p. 612. 
Also see 2 Thompson On Real Property (1961 
Replacement) § 371, pp. 488-489. 
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spondent's which parked safely behind him; eating of the portion of the street and alley 
under those conditions Park could not rea-
sonably anticipate that his car was in dan-
ger of being injured as it was. We con-
clude as a matter of law that Park was not 
guilty of contributory negligence. No per-
son could reasonably find that he failed to 
act as a reasonably prudent person would 
act under those circumstances. 
We have not found any case directly in 
was a denial of due process. 
Judgment reversed and cause remanded. 
I. Municipal Corporattois <§=*657(2, 4) 
Statute requiring petition by al\ land-
owners directed to proper public authority 
for approval of vacating of city streets 
should normally be followed, but a city by 
ordinance may vacate or abandon streets 
even in a subdivision if public exigency re-
point, but in the following cases the facts
 q u i r e s a n d i f a procedure is followed sat-
were similar: Webb v. Smith, 176 Va. 235,
 i s f y i n g . statutory requirements and require-
10 S.E.2d 503, 131 A.LJL 558; Conrey v.
 m / n / o f d u e ^ i n c l u d i ^ M c 
Abramson, 294 Mass. 431, 2 N.E.2d 203.
 n o t i c e > f a i r h e a r i n g > md consideration of 
Each of those cases invoke the stopping of ^ y substantial rights involved. U.C.A. 
a car on a road under what we think were 
more dangerous conditions than involved 
in this case, yet the court held as a matter 
of law that such driver was not guilty of 
negligence. 
Judgment reversed with directions to 
proceed in accordance with this opinion. 
Costs to appellant. 
WOLFE, C. J., and McDONOUGH, 
CROCKETT, and HENRIOD, JJ., concur. 
IBE«5YSm> 
BOSKOVICH et al. v. MIDVALE CITY 
CORP. etmL 
No. 7758. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 17,1932. 
Milan Boskovich and Frieda M. Boskovieh 
brought suit against Midvale City Corpora-
tion, and others, for an injunction ana for 
damages because of the dosing of a street 
and alley by city ordinance. The 3rd Judi-
cial District Court of Salt Lake County, Da-
vid T. Lewis, J., entered judgment for de-
fendants, and plaintiffs appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Henriod, X, held that the va-
I. Hall v. North Ogden, 109 Utah 304, 166 
P.2d 221; Wall v. Salt Lake City, 50 
Utah 593, 168 P. 766; Sowadzki v. Salt 
Lake County, 36 Utah 127. 1C1 P. I l l ; 
1943, 15-S-8, 78-5-6 to 78-5-8. 
2. Constitutional Law <S=278(h 
Eminent Domain <5=M06 
Where city without notice to, applica-
tion by, or hearing of any kind afforded any 
owner of realty in platted subdivision of 
city enacted ordinance vacating part of 
street and alley where school board owned 
realty abutting on both sides of street, so 
that a cul-de-sac was created as to lots of 
certain landowners, there was a taking of 
property without due process of law and 
without just compensation. U.C.A. 1943, 
15-8^8, 78-5-6 to 7&-5-8; U.S.C.A.Const. 
Amends. 5, 14; Const art. 1, §§ 7, 22.1 
3. Municipal Corporations €=657(7) 
Even if city, in vacating portion of 
street on both sides of which property of 
school board abutted, had satisfied require-
ments of due process by giving reasonable 
notice and conducting a fair hearing, still 
city could have vacated no more than t*he 
public easement or right which the city had 
in the street, which would have effect of 
relieving city from further responsibility 
for maintenance and control, but private 
easement of landowner would have persist-
ed.2 
Pugsley, Hayes & Rampton, Salt Lake 
City, for appellants. 
Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501, 126 P. 
959. 
2. Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501, 126 P. 
959. 
*.*a.wx*xw AXirUXbJLAXb, ZQ. BE&LtitS 
Ben G. Bagley, Midvale, Grant Macfar-
lane, Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
HENRIOD, Justice. 
Appeal from a no cause of action judg-
ment. Plaintiffs sought an injunction and 
damages against defendants, where a por-
tion of a street and alley was closed by city 
ordinance. The judgment is reversed and 
remanded, with costs on appeal to plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs own lots in Eastvale Addition, 
a platted, recorded and accepted subdivi-
sion in Midvale. The street and alley in 
question are included therein, and the shad-
ed area of the subjoined sketch represents 
the closed portion. 
part of the school yard, creating a cul-de-
sac as to plaintiffs' property on Jordan Ave-
nue and as to the property of Cox and 
Draper on the alley. 
[1] The city justifies its action under 
general statutory authority granting cities 
power to create and vacate streets and al-
leys by ordinance.1 Plaintiffs challenge the 
procedure pursued as being in excess of 
that authority, and urge that where a plat-
ted subdivision is involved, the authority 
claimed by the city is interdicted and pre-
empted by special statutes,2 requiring peti-
tion by all owners directed to the proper 
public authority for approval. We believe 
this latter statute normallv should be fol-
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Without notice to, application by, or 
hearing of any kind afforded any property 
owner, Midvale's council enacted an ordi-
nance vacating the shaded area, which had 
been used for vehicular travel. The school 
board owned property abutting on both 
sides of the shaded area, and it took posses-
sion thereof as owner to the middle of a 
vacated street, fenced it off and made it a 
I. Title 1&-&-8, U.OA.1943: 'They may 
lay out, establish, open * * * streets, 
alleys * * * and may vacate the same 
or parts thereof, by ordinance." 
| * - 5 1 ' - * 
lowed, but recognize the fact that a city, by 
ordinance, might vacate or abandon streets 
even in a subdivision, if public exigency re-
quires and if a procedure is followed satis-
fying statutory requirements and require-
ments of due process, including reasonable 
notice, a fair hearing and consideration of 
any substantial rights involved. Plaintiffs 
complain that no such procedure was fol-
2. Tide 78-5-6, 7 and 8, U.O.A.1943. 
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lowed here, and we are consffa1ned~ItoI==the^platted-streets, dedicated and duly ac-
agree. cepted, shall continue as a means of travel 
-^ until public exigency otherwise demands,-
a r • i - i i _ J A _ _ A J„. ~-J :..* [2] There are a number of ways th t\
 i n w h i c h l a t t e r e v e n t d u e p r o c e s s ^ j u s t 
f_eCt! m l y ^ ^ f . ° !^ ° S l _ . f „ % . ° r - I compensation must enter the picture 
Midvale dinance, there must be something more than its mere enactment. We believe and hold 
that the procedure followed by Midvale in 
this case, sans notice, petition or hearing, 
was an unquestioned departure from the 
elementary principle that property cannot 
be taken without due process of law and 
without just compensation.4 
[3] Furthermore, even if the city had| 
satisfied the requirements of due process 
by giving reasonable notice and conducting 
a fair hearing, still it could have vacated no 
more than the public easement or right 
which the city had in the shaded area,6 
which would in turn have the effect of re-
lieving it from further responsibility for 
maintenance and control.* The private 
easement which Mr. B, plaintiff herein had,] 
would have persisted. J 
This case involves a duly platted subdivi-
sion containing streets and alleys and is 
thus distinguishable from the authority 
cited by defendants.7 We have held, in a 
case cited even by defendants, that if the 
dedicated streets of a subdivision are laid 
out and right to the use thereof has arisen, 
a private easement arises therein which 
constitutes a vested proprietary interest in 
the lot owners, which easement survives 
'extinguishment of any co-existing public 
easement calling for just compensation.8 
Hence, Mr. B cannot be cul-de-sacked by 
the city or the school board without due 
process of law, and a respect for any loss 
of use proven to have been enjoyed by him 
theretofore,—though sudi loss may not be 
great. This is as it should be, since people 
customarily buy property in subdivisions, 
Defendants are not remediless, 
might have ended the public easement byj 
ordinance so long as pertinent statutory and 
due process requirements were satisfied. 
The school board might have eliminated the 
private easement by orderly employment of 
the statutory provisions and fundamental 
principles relating to eminent domain,9 but 
neither could take from Mr. B his private 
easement without fair "wippngatinn. 
In remanding this case, the trial court is 
instructed to enter an order requiring re-
moval of any obstruction on the property 
described, unless the parties by stipulation 
amicably agree to maintain the status quo 
until such time as their differences may be 
resolved. There seems to be little reason 
in this case, where it appears obvious that 
the school children need the space, and the 
damage to Mr. B does not appear to be very 
great, why the parties by stipulation and 
amendment of their pleadings to conform 
with principles here announced, and after a 
hearing, cannot arrive at a fair adjustment 
in the interest of these children. 
WADE, MCDONOUGH and CROCK-
ETT, JJ., concur. 
WOLFE; Chief Justice (concurring). 
I concur, but make the following observa-
tion. In the main opinion, reference is 
made to tfhe "public easement" of Midvale 
City in the street which was closed. Under 
Sec. 78-5-4, U.CA.1943, the City has a de-
terminable or limited fee which is a higher 
right than an easement That section pro-
vides that the filing and recordation of 
part of the consideration for which is paid m a p s a n d p l a t s o f a s u b d i v r s i o n " * 
on the representation and assumption that sha11 c * c r a t c ** a d e d i c a t l o n o f a11 s t r e e t s-
3. Hall v. North Ogden, 109 Utah 304, 
166 P.2d 221; Wall v. Salt Lake City, 50 
Utah 593, 168 P. 766; Sowadzki v. Salt 
Lake County, 36 Utah 127, 104 P. I l l ; 
Title 78-5, supra; Title 1S-8-8, supra. 
4. Utah Const., ArfcL, Sees. 7 and 22; U.S. 
Const., V and XTV Amendments; Tut-
tle v. Sowadzki 41 Utah 501. 126 P. 959. 
5. Tuttle v. Sowadzki, supra; 150 A.L.R. 
652, 658. 
6. 150 A.LJL 644. 
7. Robinett v. Price, 74 Utah 512, 280 P. 
736. 
8. Tuttle v. Sowadzki, supra. 
9. Title 104-61, U.CA.1943. 
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alleys and other public places, and sshall 
vest the fee of such parcels of land as are 
therein expressed, named or intended for 
public uses in such county, city or town for 
the public for the uses therein named or in-
tended" (Emphasis added.) It is true that 
in the cases of Sowadzki v. Salt Lake Coun-
ty, 36 Utah 127, 104 P. I l l , and Turtle v. So-
wadzki, 41 Utah 501, 126 P. 959, this court 
referred to the interest of the county in a 
platted subdivision as both a determinable or 
a limited fee and a public easement, using 
the terms interchangeably. But the terms 
are not synonymous. The confusion may 
have stemmed from Sec. 36-1-7, U.C.A. 
1943, providing that "By taking or accepting 
land for a highway the public acquires only 
the right of way and incidents necessary to 
enjoying and maintaining it. A transfer of 
land bounded by a highway passes the title 
of the person whose estate is transferred to 
the middle of the highway." Sec 36-1-7 is 
found in our code in the title on Highways, 
wfaereas Sec. 78-5-4 is found under the title 
on Real Property and under the section 
thereof dealing with Plats and Subdivi-
sions. Clearly, Sec. 78-5-4 governs the 
rights of a county, city or town in the 
streets of a platted subdivision. While it 
makes no difference in the instant case 
whether the City has a determinable fee or 
a public easement, the distinction is pointed 
out because there may be cases where the 
difference is vital. See White v. Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 239 P.2d 210. 
*Q | KEY NUMBER STS1IM> 
HOLTON v. HOLTON. 
No. 7791. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 21, 1952. 
Action by Virginia B. Holton against Par-
ley P. Holton. The Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Clarence E. Baker, 
J., rendered an adverse decision, and plain-
tiff appealed. The respondent moved to 
dismiss the appeal. The Supreme Court, 
Per Curiam, held that there was no suffi-
cient showing of injustice or excuse to re-
lieve appellant from failure to comply with 
rule requiring timely service of a desig-
nation of record. 
Appeal dismissed. 
I. Courts <§=>€5(4) 
Although new Rules of Civil Procedure 
were intended to provide liberality in proce-
dure, it is expected that they will be fol-
lowed,, and unless reasons satisfactory to 
court are advanced as basis for relief from 
complying with them, parties will not be 
excused from so doing. 
2. Courts <@=>85(4) 
Parties will be relieved from failure 
to comply with new Rules of Civil Proce-
dure only when showing is made that some 
inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or 
mistake has occurred and that substantial 
injustice will be done. 
3. Appeal and Error <§=3607(l) 
Record disclosed no sufficient showing 
that injustice would result and that failure 
to serve designation of record within time 
and as required by Rule of Civil Procedure 
occurred because of excusable neglect or 
other cause which would require court in 
interests of justice to relieve appellant from 
failure to comply, and hence appeal would 
be dismissed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rules 73(a), 75(a). 
D. Ray Owen, Jr., Lyle McLean Ward, 
and Charles L. Ovard, all of Salt Lake 
City, for appellant. 
Ned Warnock, George A. Critchlow, and 
A. W. Watson, all of Salt Lake City, for 
respondent. 
PER CURIAM. 
In this case the respondent has moved to 
dismiss the appeal because the appellant 
failed to serve upon respondent a designa-
tion of record within the time and as re-
quired by Rule 75(a) U.R.C.P., although 
the designation of record was filed with the 
district court. 
Rule 73(a) makes this failure to serve a 
designation of record on the respondent 
non-jurisdictional, but also gives this court 
